KARACHI: By the time this piece is posted on the website, there might be a comprehensive operation or in the process of rooting out what the Pakistani nation-state would call the seeds of Baloch separatism. The offensive might be a decisive one for both sides and can also degenerate into another episode of attrition between the largest yet the most sparsely populated federating unit and the center.
States across the region have been faced with these hard choices when it comes to embracing within its fold divergent nationalities and ethnicities. The usual package for dealing with such a situation has been a carrot-and-stick policy. A bit of appeasement and a bit of state power. Over the years, central power has learned the need to engage in dialogue instead of using the state power relentlessly. In the neighboring states of India and Iran, there has been a mix of carrot and stick, but even then, the weight has been accorded to dialogue and adjustment. Despite the bad blood between the Indian state and the Sikhs of Punjab; and bitter memories of the 1984 to 1987 operation in Indian Punjab; the state since then has been careful in dealing with the federating unit and the religious identity. Many political analysts feel that the farmer movement’s amicable settlement with Delhi has been partly motivated by the fact that the Indian state did not want to hit the raw nerve, the farmer movement being centered in Punjab and dominated by the Sikhs by denying them what was their demand.
In the case of Kashmir, despite all the efforts post-August 5, 2019, the Indian state still tries to play with various political groups in a bid that the arrangement does not go to waste. Likewise, in other parts of the country, small-time arrangements are preferred over the blatant use of state power.
In the case of Iran; with a history of conflict in Kurdistan since 1979, the theocracy has been careful not to hit the hornet nest. The Mahsa Amini episode in 2021; a Kurdish girl killed under mysterious circumstances in Tehran, which triggered anti Hijab riots; had a clear separatist angle. One of the ring leaders of the protest happened to be an old Kurdish militant hand. Yet the Iranian nation state acted prudently and it mended its approach towards the Iranian society altogether. Its recent adjustment can be gauged the way reformists were allowed a free reign and similarly, the supreme leader threw his weight with the new president in a clear bid that the clerical establishment wanted to be in line with aspirations of the Iranian sentiments on the street. It may be pointed out here that the reformist staffed cabinet did not faced any usual hiccups from the Majlis in its confirmation process.
In the backdrop of the experiences of the two hostile neighbors namely India and Iran as described in Pakistani LEA press releases from time to time, what are the lessons and insights for the Pakistani nation state? A very cursory look at the treatment of the February 2024 elections in Pakistan and June elections in Iran illustrate a hard fact that the Pakistani establishment went by its whims, while in the case of Iran; the theocracy willingly ceded its space for the appeasement of the Iranian masses. In a way, without a devastating regime change, the Iranian establishment tried to find a common cause with Iranians, who might not be agreeing with the goals of the leadership. The assassination of Ismael Hania was one such incident, which had all the ingredients to break that arrangement between the theocracy and the street, but it was managed somehow or another.
Coming back to Pakistan, the troubled relations between the federating units and the center leave much to be desired at. In 1973, soon after the 1971 debacle in former East Pakistan, Pakistanis found their army and air force deployed in Baluchistan to crush what the official media called a separatist movement. That deployment which was supported by the late Shah of Iran with Iranian Army aviation Cobra Gunships, supplemented the strafing runs over the heads of bewildered Balochi tribesmen by French Built Mirages of PAF. The Pakistani establishment looked a bit like the Arab regimes, who had the temptation to deploy their assets in the scenarios which could have been dealt easily with dialogue.
After the operation, there has been a sense of alienation in that province from the center at the street level. However there seems to have been no concentrated efforts to win over the disgruntled element. Generally, what has been observed has been finding few favorites among the dissident ranks to get the show running; meaning not going for a solution, rather only managing a situation.
Things could have been corrected, if the state has tried dialogue. Yet the inevitable happened on August 26, 2006, when a respected Baloch leader Nawab Akbar Bugti was hit by missiles, much to the resentment across the restive province. Practically, the province has been on fire ever since for the last 18 years.
In the backdrop of the history, the mutual mistrust and the general mood of the dominant powers, there are ample chances that the establishment would go for few favorites being cultivated and manage the rest with the use of the state might.
Here it is pertinent to note that there has been much bad blood due to the fact that the unbridled disregard for the constitutional provisions on human rights by the law enforcing agencies has caused a situation where middle income groups to poor sections of the Balochi society have borne the brunt of disappearances or possible killing by the LEA, with judiciary and the social media acting in complete meek way; not showing the will to reign in the powerful sections of the establishment as per the dictates of the 1973 constitution.
If the disregard has been restricted to core militants; things were different, however any educated Baloch living in Lahore and Karachi being picked up at will has meant that the cream of the Balochi society is at war with the establishment.
The current situation as developed after the incidents of August 26, 2024 in Baluchistan and the consequent follow up by the administrative face of the powers in control again suggests that the trust for the solution still lies in use of brute force, than any dialogue of appeasement of the disgruntled sections of the Balochi society.
For the Pakistani establishment, the choices are very clear; whether it goes for a calculated carrot and stick; carrot for favorites and stick for the militants. If that is the case, the situation might improvement superficially. On the count that the causes of the unrest and resentment have not been addressed, rather pushed beneath the rugs. Given the fact that economic growth is nowhere to be sensed, political stability at the federal level is fragile; in the backdrop a federating unit afflicted with a guerilla war is not a favorable proposition for the Pakistani nation state.
Conclusively; until the root causes of resentment are not addressed, blaming the hostile states and intelligence agencies might not do the needful, being superficially hoped. Without doubt, hard decisions need to be taken; hard in a sense that a radical shift in approach is needed to correct the situation.
