During his tenure as President of Pakistan Asif Ali Zardari went out of the way to support the embattled Syrian President Bashar-al-Asad as he was struggling to survive against Sunni militant groups in the Syrian Civil War.
The reason was simple, the Pakistani government itself was struggling hard in the face of the rising threat of militancy which left an impression in the international diplomatic circles that the Pakistan Taliban posed a threat to the survival of the Pakistani government—though there never was any such chance in reality.
President Zardari gave special significance to the possibility that Pakistani diplomacy should not lean in favour of groups attempt- ing to topple the legitimate government in Damascus – although there were tempting trends in the international diplomatic circles to support the groups that happened to be on the right side of international media.
In the event, Pakistan stuck with the policy of supporting the government in Syria with the view that any weakening of its resolve will create problems of legitimacy for the Pakistani government itself.
Fast forward to August 2021: The Afghan Taliban, an armed militant group with no political and legal legitimacy, stormed the capital city of Afghanistan in the middle of the month and dislodged a democratically elected government of President Ashraf Ghani.
The Pakistani foreign policy establishment blindly jumped into the trap: Although the militant threat to the Pakistani government has been decimated through military opera- tions, militant organizations can regroup at any time given the changing security environment in our neighbourhood.
Militant groups challenging the legitimacy of the Pakistani government still exist, and theoretically speaking, the threat to the legitimacy of the government in Islamabad is as potent or as weak as it was during the times of Syrian civil war.
Pakistan’s former senior diplomat, Ambassador Abdul Basit disagrees. “I remember the President taking this position on the Syrian civil war, but the Afghan situation is totally different from the Syrian situation”, said in response to the queries of The Truth International (TTI).
“In Afghanistan Taliban government was dislodged through use of force and now they have regained power. The Taliban never recognized Ashraf Ghani as legitimate government”.
His attention was drawn to the fact that Pakistan has always recognized AShraf Ghani as legitimate President. “Well Pakistan has always recognized anyone who is in control of Kabul” said the Ambassador, adding there are very potent voices inside Pakistani society who think the Taliban’s militant takeover of Kabul has negative implications for Pakistan’s political system.
Nevertheless there appears to be a sense of elation in Islamabad’s power corridors over the victory of Taliban in Afghanistan. Self-congratulatory statements, which reflect a sense of vindication, are coming out of Islamabad. There seems to be a palpable sense of euphoria over the fact that India has been completely excluded from the power game in Afghanistan.
But this is not the end of Pakistan’s Afghan worries. The Pakistani military and foreign policy establishment is clearly looking at three scenarios which could prove to be security nightmares as well as a huge humanitarian crisis for the country. These are:
- A civil War in Afghanistan or political unrest, which can send a large numbers of refugees to Pakistan
- A humanitarian crisis including possibili- ty of large scale spread of Covid-19 and food shortages due to drought again can send large numbers of refugees to Pakistan
- Spoiler’s violence, as western security experts have feared, in which hostile intelli- gence agencies can use remnants of terror groups for terror attacks and sectarian violence inside Pakistan.
There seems to be little resistance to Taliban’s military victories inside Afghani- stan. One city after another fell as the Taliban advanced militarily in every part of the country.
However, an old pattern of ethnic minorities rallying around Vice President of former Afghan regime Amrullah Saleh and son of Ahmed Shah Masood mustering material and man to put up a resistance from the north of the country appears to be a glimmer of hope for anti-Taliban forces across Afghanistan.
A largescale civil war seems unlikely in Afghanistan at present, but the possibility of political unrest cannot be ruled out. There were several political protests in Afghanistan’s cities after the Taliban took over government powers in Kabul.
These protests were peaceful in nature, although the Taliban did resort to use of forces to quell these protests in some cases.
At present civil war in Afghanistan seems unlikely primarily because none of the neighbours of Afghanistan seems to be in the mood of feeding a rebellion against
Taliban. The regional response to Taliban’s military takeover of government in Afghanistan has been mostly supportive.
Iran has described withdrawal of US troops and subsequent events as good omen for the national reconciliation in Afghanistan. Russia does not perceive any threat to itself or to its Central Asian client states from Taliban regaining state power or their military victories. China wants to develop diplomatic relations with the Taliban government. And people in Pakistani state machinery are euphoric over their “strategic assets” taking over the reign of power in Afghanistan.
This evolving regional response is highly favourable to Taliban primarily because in the past civil wars in Afghanistan have always been fuelled by one or more of the neighbours of this war torn country provid- ing weapons, training and finances to the one of the other side in the internal conflict.
Now it seems all the neighbours are happy with the rise of the Taliban as the dominant military force in the country.
A report by Washington based think-tank, CSIS under the title “Taliban Takeover: Humanitarian Implications and Recommendations for the United States” conjures the possibility of large scale violence in post-withdrawal Afghanistan in the follow- ing words.
“Although some experts argued that a form of “truce” had been reached between U.S. forces and Taliban fighters, by the end of 2020 Afghanistan was experiencing sustained armed violence that has persisted throughout 2021.
“Data from the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) showed a substantial increase in violent confrontations and armed attacks throughout the country, with violent confrontations in 29 of 34 provinces, especially in rural areas. The impact on the civilian population was substantial.
“The UN Assistance Mission in Afghani- stan (UNAMA) reports that civilian casualties between January and June 2021 increased by 50 percent from the same time in 2020. In fact, humanitarian and civilian protection advocates had raised the alarm about the rise in violent confrontations,
pointing out that Taliban forces had been prepositioned outside many of Afghani- stan’s major cities, displacing civilians.
“The operational environment for humanitarian organizations prior to last week was also highly complex. While Afghanistan has always been among the more dangerous places for aid workers, recent attacks on Halo Trust and Action Contre le Faim (ACF), concurrent with the increase in violence, highlighted the dangers faced by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and underscored the complexity of navigating Afghanistan’s security environment.”
Humanitarian crisis and implications for Pakistan:
The same CSIS report paints a dismal picture of the impending humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan which the Taliban are ill-prepared to deal with. Forced displacements, refugees returning from
Pakistan and Iran, spread of Covid-19 and drought like conditions all add up to a multiple layers of humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan.
The report says: “Prior to the withdrawal of U.S. forces and the Taliban takeover of Kabul, Afghanistan was already mired in multiple overlapping humanitarian crises. Widespread forced displacement, together with refugee returns from Iran and Pakistan, means millions of Afghans have been disconnected from their communities and require assistance from local and international humanitarian organizations.
“Drought conditions threaten agricultural production. Food security indicators are alarming, with concerns over rising malnutrition rates, and a third wave of Covid-19 is spreading, in a country with limited health infrastructure to provide the necessary care.
“The United Nations’ 2021 Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) for Afghanistan called for $1.3 billion in humanitarian aid, but the appeal remains 40 percent funded, despite renewed attention to Afghanistan that emerged during the 2020 peace negotiations with the Taliban and ongoing troop withdrawals.”
This paints a very dismal picture of the humanitarian situation in Afghanistan and with government structures in complete disarray, there is hardly anyone on the ground to take care of the Afghan people, raising concerns in neighbouring countries especially Pakistan that the direction of any future exodus will be towards Pakistan.
Spoiler’s violence and Pakistan’s fears
There is a dreadful prediction in the western security experts forecast about what international terror groups like Al-Qaida, Al-Qaeda in Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) and ISIS could do in the neighbouring countries of Afghanistan as the post-withdrawal Afghanistan is likely to plunge into a military chaos or anarchy in the coming days, weeks and months.
In what western intelligence officials, reportedly, are describing as spoiler’s violence the neighbouring countries of Afghanistan could use the remnants of international terror groups still hiding in different parts of Afghanistan to settle their scores with their rival countries.
In this regard, western intelligence is specifically mentioning the names of Pakistan, India and Afghanistan as countries whose security apparatus or intelligence agencies could settle old scores by using remnants of terror groups to carry out violence in the neighbouring countries of Afghanistan.
American officials and leaders have variously described Al-Qaida in Afghani- stan as a shadow of its former shelf or very weak to carry out terror attacks in mainland America. ISIS saw its peak in Afghanistan in the period between 2014 and 2016 when there was a sudden rise in its profile and groups and bands from Afghan Taliban defecting to their mother organisation to join ISIS. ISIS in Afghanistan in recent days has also seen a declining profile as the groups and bands of former Taliban defect ISIS to re-join their mother organisation
Spoiler’s violence could take the form of terror attacks inside Pakistani territory and if Western intelligence experts are to be believed Indian intelligence could use remnants of terror groups against Pakistan.
This doesn’t seem far-fetched when seen in the light of Pakistani allegations that India intelligence has penetrated Tehreek-e-Tali- ban Pakistan (TTP) and was instrumental in pushing the militant group to carry out terror attacks inside heartland Pakistan.
There are countless reports indicating the webs that link TTP with international terror groups like Al-Qaeda and ISIS, the remnants of Al-Qaeda and ISIS in Afghanistan are hosting terror groups which originated in Central Asian societies and which have been engaged in military conflict with the Central Asian governments.
The Chinese are no less concerned about the developments in Afghanistan: They know that the Chinese separatist elements are in alliance with ISIS, Taliban and Al-Qaida. Some of these Chinese separatist elements are in alliance with Pakistani Taliban and were being hosted by the latter until recently. So the fears of spoiler’s violence reaching Chinese territory are real.
Pakistan’s military establishment believes that a centralized Afghan state is absolutely necessary to control this threat. The international community must ensure that the regional countries don’t play dirty and don’t try to push forward their own proxies in the Afghan power struggle.
