Exactly 25 years ago, Anatoly Sobchak, the former mayor of St. Petersburg and a figure influential to President Vladimir Putin, sought refuge in Paris amid corruption allegations.
He was assisted by KGB lieutenant colonel Vladimir Putin, who had just assumed the position of director of Russia’s FSB. Sobchak, during an interview, hinted at Putin’s perpetual hold on power, foreseeing his reluctance to relinquish control once in office.
Now, a quarter-century later, Putin’s supporters and critics alike grasp Sobchak’s prescient observation. Putin’s recent victory in the 2020 referendum enables him to potentially rule until 2036, surpassing historical Russian leaders in tenure. Putin’s aura now reflects that of the tsars, embodying an unyielding grip on power reminiscent of monarchs whose reigns typically ended only with their demise.
The ascendance of the FSB, Russia’s security service, has been notable under Putin’s rule. Since Putin’s accession in 2000, FSB influence has extended throughout various spheres, except the military. However, recent years have seen a shift, with the FSB expanding its control, initiating internal power struggles, and asserting dominance over key sectors like industry, finance, and culture.
Putin’s victory in the 2020 election spurred the FSB to escalate its influence, targeting opposition figures and tightening control over state institutions. This push, ostensibly against corruption, serves as a facade for a deeper struggle for power.
As Putin embarks on his fifth term, the FSB’s ascendance is undeniable. The agency’s infiltration of state structures is unprecedented, with surveillance extending even to film censorship and corporate governance. Putin’s allegiance to the FSB has been evident, evidenced by controversial decisions such as exempting FSB employees from military service.
This maneuver has strained relations with other power institutions like the Defense Ministry, underscoring the FSB’s status as the new elite in Russia’s political landscape.
Historically, Russia’s nobility played a pivotal role in defending the country during the War of 1812, showcasing their leadership in times of national crisis. Today, however, elites from security agencies like the FSB, Interior Ministry, and Federal Penitentiary Service remain in the rear, tasked not with protecting the people, but with securing the regime’s power. Yet, there’s a risk of these elites integrating too deeply into the state apparatus, potentially leading it in the long term.
The power dynamics among these elites in Moscow pose a significant threat to the Kremlin, possibly more severe than external military threats. The Russian political system’s organization makes any bias towards one faction capable of destabilizing the regime or even prompting a coup by the security apparatus.
Reflecting on past political turmoil, Mikhail Khodorkovsky notes that Russia once faced a choice between Yeltsin’s presidency and a state of emergency. The security services favored the latter, which would have made Yeltsin a puppet. The rejection of the state of emergency delayed the security services’ rise to power by over a decade.
Putin’s new term begins under the increasing influence of the FSB, whose presence in government is steadily growing. While in the late Soviet Union, only 3% of top officials were from security services, this figure has surged to 70-80% today, indicating a regime dominated by security agencies.
Putin’s regime, characterized as a dictatorship of the security services, aims to prolong its sustainability. However, this could be challenged by a rising generation of security elites viewing the aging president as a weak link in the power chain.
