The election of Mr. Massoud Pezeshkian or Massoud the Physician, practically a dark horse in the recently concluded Iranian Presidential elections, heralds the return of the reformists in the Iranian political scene. A return, which has within its bag; fears, apprehensions as well as hopes. For the voting majority, it is hope as they feel the direction of the republic will change for good. Fears are for the opposing camp; which seems to be out of the public demand, forcing it to paint a doomsday scenario for the Iranian republic, as the reformists again capture the center stage.
There is no need to emphasize the fact that the victory of any particular faction in any country always has its geo-political implications. In the case of Iran, the implications are regarded as manifold. The reasons for that perception are the media image painted over decades about the republic, treated as nothing less than a pariah state, barely tolerated by the free world.
What signifies the return of the reform camp will be an interesting debate, we seek to grapple in the following paragraphs. To begin with, in the particular Iranian context, the reform and the radical camps are regarded as camps furiously opposed to each other. Generally, radicals are regarded as opposed to anything close to the creative arts, and radicals are treated as some entity always war-mongering. A closer look into the Iranian political, economic, foreign trade, and cultural scene would reveal that except for the perception of the groups regarding looking at things, they both adhere to a logical approach and do not indulge in opposition for the sake of opposition.
In the aftermath of the 2009 elections in Iran when tempers were high between the two camps; reform and radical, the issue of IMF demand for the withdrawal of subsidy on petroleum prices was not exploited by the reform camp led by former Prime Minister of Iran-Iraq war years Mir Husain Mousavi. Despite all the bad blood between Mousavi and Ahmadinejad, the IMF program was implemented without any tension in the streets; or its exploitation by the reform group.
Likewise, the issue of FATF has been a thorny issue for Iran. In the 2021 elections the former central bank governor Abdol Nasir Hemati fought the election for the president over FATF. However; after the time when late President Raeesi was elected, the issue of FATF was not thrown into the waste basket of the Iranian parliament. Though the issue remained inconclusive, the so-called radical government did not shy away from the need to addressing the issue.
For many radicals the JCPOA 2015 finalized between the reformist government of Rouhani and Obama administration was a sellout. However, the Raeesi government followed up for the revival with the Biden government without any ideological hang-ups. Generally, the radicals are regarded in international media as Middle East version of North Korean leadership. However, it remains to the credit of these radicals under Raeesi for digging out unfriendly diplomatic terrains like Saudi Arabia and Pakistan for the sake of fostering trade between the states.
Likewise, the most controversial foreign armed project by the Iranian establishment the Syrian civil war was fought during the eight consecutive years of reformist camp; with reform stalwart ex FM Jawad Zarif and Syrian war ace Qasem Soleimani exchanging notes on regular basis.
Looking at Iran in the backdrop of the above-mentioned facts; it goes to the credit of the Iranian establishment weaved around the persona of the supreme leader and the IRGC that unlike other regional establishments, it did not stop the wave of change in Iran and let the people decide. For any Iran watcher, any attempt to meddle with the results in the polls could have resulted in rioting and unrest. However, sanity prevailed and despite the fears that Iran would slide into chaos, the election of a reformist president is likely to give the Iranian republic a much-needed lease of stability in the years to come.
Towards that end; it is an interesting observation to make that reform camp has been in the corridors of power for almost 16 years since 1997, when the first-generation revolutionaries made way for the new leadership. During the period under discussion, despite the fact that republic allowed the democratic processes to take their course, the economic downturn caused a good number of Iranian public to question the validity of the Islamic republic itself. The periodic rioting over inflation and the recent Mahsa Amini rioting in 2021 created a credible impression that there was a widening gulf between the Iranian establishment and the common man on the street.
For many Iran observers, the country seemed to be on the powder keg, ready to explode anytime. For many the election of Raeesi was the last chance when radicals could have made some difference. His unfortunate death in the helicopter crash had practically thrown Iran into another cycle of political uncertainty.
Given the fact that no prominent reformist filed nomination papers, with radicals outpacing each other for the same section of voters, it was nothing short of a surprise that the dark horse Massoud was able to curry that much favor from the voter near the ballot.
Here it may be pointed out that the overwhelming presence of the radical candidates divided the radical camp, besides pushing the disgruntled Iranian towards the reformist candidate. That precisely happened in the second round of the elections. Here it is pertinent to note that at the time of second round, the former vice president during the Rouhani administration Masoumeh Ebtekar said that it was good opportunity for the protestors; who opposed Hijab or the economic conditions to make the difference by voting.
That precisely happened, when in the successive Friday, the Iranian people came out in good numbers to make clear their choice as president for the reformist candidate. Here it is important to note that the return of the reform camp has infact benefited the Iranian republic, when it was faced with internal and geo political challenges. The Middle East situation has put additional pressure on Iran to act. Likewise, the disgruntled public, if they had not found the out pouring of their anger in the form of vote for the reform candidate, they would have come out against the Nezam and provided a good fodder for the ‘regime change’ wished for by the opponents of the Nezam.
The return of the reformist candidate in the presidential elections is infact a new opportunity for Iran beyond the post Khamenei period. With so called democratic states like India and Israel in the firm grip of their respective brand of fundamentalism, the world only theocratic state voting in or rather allowing a reformist president to be elected through an honest electoral process is an asset for the Islamic Republic, much greater than the many weapon systems. Conclusively, The theocratic Nezam has finally graduated into the era, where it can compete with the world on world yardsticks, but on its own terms.
