KARACHI: The sudden demise of the incumbent President of the Islamic Republic of Iran, late Ayatollah Raeesi in a helicopter crash near the western city of Tabriz threw the Iranian political system to the specter of the snap exercise of the presidential elections one year before the schedule. That exercise was expected in June 2025.
In normal circumstances, as witnessed over many decades the exercise has been a lively practice drawing divergent political trends into the race, involving the electorate as well as the younger population of Iran. If one goes by the data, after the two terms of Syed Ali Khamenei from 1981 to 1989, post-war Iran was managed by another old guard Hashemi Rafsanjani for another two terms from 1989 to 1997.
After the exit of the old guard and upgrading of the former president Khamenei to be the supreme leader, the first-ever free elections in 1997 were swept by the reformist candidate Mohammad Khatami. The reformist President also swept again in 2001, continuing till 2005. Later the conservative Ahmadinejad was returned to power in the second round. His second bid was marred by the controversy of elections being rigged, an allegation by the reformist-led Green Movement. Though the establishment, including; Khamenei, the IRGC, and the judiciary sided with the president-elect; Ahmadinejad, the establishment in the depth of its heart knew that it had to encourage a corrective action. In 2013, the electoral exercise was independent enough to ensure a reformist President Rouhani returned to power. The reformist government was allowed a free hand by the supreme leader to negotiate JCPOA and bring Iran back into the comity of nations. In its bargain with the IRGC, it allowed the latter to wage a multi-pronged proxy war to save the pro-Iranian Baathist government in Damascus.
It was only after the cancellation of JCPOA by the Trump administration that the reformists fortunes nosedived. In the 2021 elections, the late Raeesi, who was runner up with 47 percent votes in 2017 elections bagged 62 percent votes. In the backdrop of riots against the Islamic regime in 2019, it was generally thought over that if Raeesi is elected, as a conservative, he can correct things in order to bring back the regime its power base. The reception the late president got at his funeral confirmed to an extent that he was able to develop a rapport with the common man, a rapport last cultivated by another slain president of the republic; Mohammad Ali Rajai, who could only stay at the presidency for barely 25 days.
The untimely exit of the slain president Raeesi from the scene; while created a good memory for him; but in turn exposed the system or Nezam to another test of will and wits. As the presidential race contestants are cleared allowed to run for the race; it looks like an expression of nervousness on part of the system; not to allow anyone from the reformist camp to run for the president. While in the midst of probables; no significant reformist fielded himself; it again was an expression of ill confidence on the system; firstly, that the guardian council will disqualify them and secondly, their electoral exercise might not make difference as the system might not allow the victory in the first place; and even if they return to the presidential palace, there are less chance that they will be able to do what they want to.
In the case of Ali Larijani, who is being silently suspected of being sympathetic to reform camp, his disqualification; a repeat of 2021 decision, the electoral exercise is giving the expression to the electorate in Iran; that the exercise is just a formality to give the legitimacy to the Nezam in power and there is no real contest or even any chance of turning the tide within the system. likewise, the reformist central bank governor Abdol Nasir Hemati bid for the race being thwarted by the guardian council further reinforces a bland image of the exercise as a whole.
With many advisors and ministers being cleared to run for the president; their qualification gives an impression that they are just around to give the exercise a bit of legitimacy. The election of Baqir Qalibaf, the incumbent speaker of the Majlis seems a foregone possibility.
If seen from the factors present on the surface, it is creating an impression that the Nezam is showing no signs of bending to the will of the people, whether it pertains to cultural policies or economic policies. That impression can cause a lackluster participation in the exercise as a whole. There are ample chances that the lead candidate Qalibaf, might just have a walkover.
Given the international pressure on Iran over the events in Palestine, the JCPOA shadows, the aspiration and frustration of the man on the street, the system of the government opting to go alone and refusing to take along the people in a big way can be counterproductive to the system and can possibly further isolate the regime/ system or Nezam.
As things seems to develop, it will again be squarely on the whims of the likely winner Qalibaf, how he steers the system towards a more people inclusive narrative. The late Raeesi despite being a conservative stalwart was able identify with the sections of society traditionally the domain of the reformist camp; like the people from the creative arts. Likewise, the Hijab laws were liberalized to an extent that the implementation was lax. If the new president will have the courage to challenge the conservative camp in these tested domains will an interesting development to monitor.
Another area, where Raeesi left his mark, despite difficulties, a very discouraging response from Saudi Arabia, Gulf and Pakistan can be the domain of foreign policy and regional trade. The new president will need to look at the work left unfinished by the slain president to continue.
Conclusively, the system has been challenged unaware by the turn of event; either triggered or otherwise. The nervous response to the crisis, however creates an impression that the above-mentioned continuation of policy of reconciliation between the different camps might be reversed and the society is led towards greater polarization.
Iranian Nezam had the opportunity to look more inclusive in its response to the crisis. However, the current list creates an impression otherwise. If the electorate shows its interest in the exercise still, it will be a miracle. Cutting down the list of presidential candidates on the eve of every next presidential race speaks of dearth of candidates, whom the system regards ‘safe enough’ to run for the race. In the long run it is not an encouraging omen. An absence of younger leadership might soon turn the Islamic Republic into a Supreme Soviet, with average age of leadership above 70+, a red flag for the survival of the system going forward.
