During a recent webinar hosted by an Indian General, while there was a lot of sulking at the Taliban capture of Kabul on Indian Independence Day, August 15, 2021, the General facetiously concluded the event announcing that โI want to hand over a gold medal to Pakistan for its superb handling of the Afghanistan issueโ, to which I retorted โsince we didnโt get a single medal at the Tokyo Olympics, this is a welcome gestureโ!
Pakistani policy makers should have anticipated the fallout because of Islamabadโs perceived โsuccessโ in Afghanistan, given also the โI told you soโ smug satisfaction being expressed within the country, both publicly and privately.
Interestingly, so far, neither the President of the United States, in his policy speech of August 31 or of September 7, nor his vocal predecessor who may well become his successor in 2024, nor the serving American Generals have blamed Pakistan for the debacle in Afghanistan. The US Secretary of State, Tony Blinken, has made some critical noises of โreassessmentโ of US relations with Pakistan. Mr Blinken should be asked as to what is it precisely that heโs so upset about, which warrants plans to โreassessโ US ties with Pakistan. It was the American war and the American strategy in Afghanistan that failed, a failure which we as friends had forewarned them in writing, way back in 2010, via General Kayaniโs 14-page Memo to President Obama.
The United States asked Pakistan for release of the Taliban leadership (Mullah Baradar, notably) and then pleaded with us to push the Taliban to start talks with them in Doha, where the Americans had already arranged for the opening of the Taliban office, courtesy Qatar. The US also unilaterally released 5 top Taliban leaders they had imprisoned in Guantanamo on โterrorismโ charges to ensure their participation in the Doha talks. The US then held formal, direct talks for 18 months with the Taliban, including Sirajuddin Haqqani, whose signed OpEd was printed in The New
York Times on February 20, 2020. And the President of the United States personally phoned to congratulate Mullah Baradar on the successful signing of the peace deal with the Taliban on February 29, 2020, all these developments conferring legitimacy on the Taliban and facilitating their return to power.
The US Centcom Commander personally negotiated in Kabul with the Taliban on August 15, 2021, on the โrules of the gameโ of the American evacuation, which was completed by August 31. During this period, the CIA Chief also visited Kabul to meet with the Taliban leadership and he came twice to Islamabad seeking help during the โlast lapโ of the American occupation, which Pakistan happily provided.
Secretary Blinken is talking of โreassessmentโ when the US has already taken two strategic decisions that directly impinge on Pakistanโs national security: our adversary, India, as their best friend and strategic partner in South Asia, and our closest ally, China, as their strategic rival, competitor and adversary, along with Russia. No ambiguity at all, on both these counts.
The more serious issue is the resolution of the European Parliament on Afghanistan passed on September 16, which is quite comprehensive, with a damning indictment of the โcorrupt Kabul political eliteโ including seeking an investigation of financial misappropriation by the โfailed leadership of Ashraf Ghaniโ. The long resolution is also a critique of the manner of the unilateral American exit done without consulting European allies, plus takes a few pot-shots at Pakistan too. While stating Pakistan โbears responsibility for security and stability in Afghanistanโ, thereโs a Blinken-like threat to review the EUโs GSP-Plus given to Pakistan. At the same time, it offers increased support to countries โhosting large numbers of (Afghan) migrants and refugeesโ! However, there is no appreciation of Pakistanโs pivotal role in the evacuation of EU citizens
post-Taliban takeover of Afghanistan, although individual EU leaders have publicly acknowledged Pakistanโs humanitarianism.
More importantly, the Resolution also outlines future steps that the European Union must take, for instance, โa comprehensive lesson-based strategy as regards Afghanistan and other countries in the surrounding regionโ. This provides an opening for Pakistan to engage with the EU and itโs Parliament to present its fact-based perspective on our role.
And this is where Pakistanโs problem lies. Thereโs a propensity for blaming others, cribbing or criticising, or whining about our own victimhood, or attributing events like the New Zealand cricket tourโs cancellation to unsubstantiated conspiracy-theories. Letโs get the facts right to resolve the core issue in the current scenario: our abysmal failure to craft or sell a credible narrative. Three problems are noteworthy.
First, at the level of the Pakistani government or State, there has been NO serious strategic engagement with either the international (read, Western) media, the United States Congress or the European Parliament, or the international think tank circuit. None whatsoever at all!
Second, as far as foreign policy goes, itโs a case of โconfusion worse confoundedโ! Five power centres are currently dabbling in foreign policy: a) the PM who likes to pontificate on foreign policy from time to time; b) the Foreign Office, which presents the โofficially-certified truthโ in a somewhat sanitised manner; c) the COAS, who directly handles Military Diplomacy in four key areas: China, US, India and Afghanistan; d) the ISI Chief, who executes the directions of his Boss; e) โTalk Show Ministersโ, who peddle, in their own convoluted manner, the โall is wellโ mantra on every foreign policy issue at nightly interactions on national television. The end result: a half-baked product for domestic consumption fails to find any traction abroad, except as an ad hoc, moment-to-moment โfire-fighting exerciseโ.
Third, thereโs the problem of the Pakistani DNA, a proclivity for passivity, plus a reactive or a waiting approach. I remember, during my student days in Lahore, reading an apt article about this Pakistani mindset by a reputed scholar and psychologist, Dr Ajmal, who later became Vice Chancellor of the Punjab University. In his famous article, โA Nation of Waitersโ, Dr Ajmal noted the passivity of most Pakistanis who were always โwaitingโ for something to happen: some are โwaitingโ to get a job, others โwaitingโ to get married and some even โwaitingโ for a Revolution! Similarly, for most of 2021, the foreign policy machinery of the Pakistan Government has been โwaitingโ for a phone call from President Biden, as if itโs a test of our diplomatic manhood!
So, what are the Doโs and Donโts in the single most important national security and foreign policy challenge for Pakistan since 9/11. First the Donโts: Donโt act as spokesman for the Afghan Taliban; Donโt crib all the time about โconspiracies being hatched against Pakistanโ; Donโt overpromise on what we can deliver.
Regarding the Doโs: first and foremost, behave with Dignity, Pakistanโs destiny will not be determined by one phone call from a faraway capital; strategic clarity about โred linesโ on foreign policy (Nuclear program, Kashmir, Indian hegemony, ties with China, Russia, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Iran, CPEC/regional connectivity, No New Cold War); offer cooperation to US/West on counter-Terrorism, Afghanistan stability, Pakistanโs willingness to participate, as hub of regional connectivity: BRI, TAPI, EUโs โGlobal Gatewayโ, Bidenโs B3W, even revival of IPI (Iran-Pakistan-India) Pipeline.
Recent developments provide Pakistan with โstrategic spaceโ and more autonomy and greater regional room to manoeuvre, together with our friends and partners. Pakistanโs importance has been enhanced, as Islamabad is viewed as the key conduit to Kabul. Therefore, itโs time to get cracking for a national, above partisan politics. proactive and prudent strategy that seizes the opportunity to promote peace and stability in the strife-torn region after 42 years.

